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commonness of the food, suggesting egocentrism as a nonmotivated source of comparative bias. When commonness 
did not vary, the healthiness of the foods impacted both direct and indirect comparisons, with a greater influence 
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Understanding how healthfully people think they eat compared to others has implications for their
motivation to engage in dietary change and the adoption of health recommendations. Our goal was to
investigate the scope, sources, and measurements of bias in comparative food consumption beliefs.
Across 4 experiments, participants made direct comparisons of how their consumption compared to their
peers’ consumption and/or estimated their personal consumption of various foods/nutrients and the
consumption by peers, allowing the measurement of indirect comparisons. Critically, the healthiness and
commonness of the foods varied. When the commonness and healthiness of foods both varied, indirect
comparative estimates were more affected by the healthiness of the food, suggesting a role for
self-serving motivations, while direct comparisons were more affected by the commonness of the food,
suggesting egocentrism as a nonmotivated source of comparative bias. When commonness did not vary,
the healthiness of the foods impacted both direct and indirect comparisons, with a greater influence on
indirect comparisons. These results suggest that both motivated and nonmotivated sources of bias should
be taken into account when creating interventions aimed at improving eating habits and highlights the
need for researchers to be sensitive to how they measure perceptions of comparative eating habits.
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Obesity rates have increased substantially over the last three
decades in the United States (Flegal, Carroll, Ogden, & Curtin,
2010; Kuczmarski, Flegal, Campbell, & Johnson, 1994). Perceived
social norms about eating habits—specifically, judgments of how
people’s own food consumption compares to that of peers—may
play an important role in the current obesity epidemic. While there
is no direct evidence connecting perceived social norms about
eating to the obesity epidemic, two lines of research provide
suggestive evidence for the role of perceived social norms. The
first line of research highlights that people tend to believe they eat
more healthily than others (Klein & Kunda, 1993; Klein, 1996;
Miles & Scaife, 2003; Perloff & Fetzer, 1986; Raats, Sparks,
Geekie, & Shepherd, 1999; Sparks, Shepherd, Wieringa, & Zim-
mermanns, 1995; Weinstein & Klein, 1995). For example, most
people believe they eat less fatty and sugary foods compared to the
average person (Klein & Kunda, 1993; Klein, 1996). This is
important, given that comparative information is often more influ-
ential than absolute information in guiding related judgments and
behavior (e.g., Blalock, DeVellis, Afifi, & Sandler, 1990; Goffin &
Olson, 2011; Klein, 2002, 2003; Lipkus & Klein, 2006; Mahler,
Kulik, Gerrard, & Gibbons, 2010). The second line of research
highlights how perceptions about the consumption of others exerts
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a powerful influence on an individual’s own eating. Specifically,
social modeling research has demonstrated that people tend to eat
more when they observe or believe that others eat more and eat
less when they observe or believe that others eat less (Cruwys,
Bevelander, & Hermans, 2015; Vartanian, Spanos, Herman, &
Polivy, 2015). Consistent with this research on social modeling is
the finding that obesity spreads across social networks (Christakis
& Fowler, 2007; Pachucki, Jacques, & Christakis, 2011). Taken
together, the research described above suggests that people’s food
consumption is influenced by the actual and perceived eating
habits of others and that people believe that they already eat more
healthily than their peers. If people believe they eat more health-
fully than others, then motivation for dietary change may be weak
and may even lead to an increase in unhealthy eating, since people
tend to assimilate toward the eating behaviors of similar others
(see Polivy & Pliner, 2015 for a recent review). Additionally, since
people minimally process or ignore messages that seem irrelevant
(Chen & Chaiken, 1999; Clark, 2014; Petty & Cacioppo, 1981),
health campaigns and recommendations may seem personally in-
applicable and unworthy of notice by even the most relevant
recipients if they already think that they eat more healthily than
others. Consequently, understanding the scope, sources, and mea-
surements of bias when people make comparative estimates about
food consumption is critical for understanding how to effectively
create interventions to promote healthier eating (Miles & Scaife,
2003; Scaife, Miles, & Harris, 2006).
Scope of Bias
Although existing experiments document instances of bias when
individuals compare their eating to the consumption of others, they
are not definitive about the scope of the bias (Miles & Scaife,
2003; Scaife et al., 2006). Specifically, experiments have not
systematically varied the foods about which people are queried,
leaving open the possibility that the direction and perhaps magni-
tude of observed comparative biases are narrowly restricted to
particular food items or, alternatively, are so broad-based as to
simply reflect that people generally underestimate their food con-
sumption, even for many healthy foods. Stated differently, ob-
served biases in comparative food consumption may reflect idio-
syncrasies of the specific foods chosen in the previous research
(Wells & Windschitl, 1999), in which case interventions based on
this research may only be effective for these specific foods. Al-
ternatively, observed biases in comparative food consumption may
reflect a general bias that affects all comparative food estimates
relatively equally, suggesting that interventions could focus on any
food. A third possibility, which we will argue for in the next
section, is that the different attributes of food may introduce
different sources of bias so that foods chosen as targets in an
assessment or intervention should be done so with attention to
these attributes. As a result, the present work assessed comparative
biases across numerous food items that varied on key dimensions
of theoretical and applied interest.
Sources of Bias
While the previous research on comparative consumption biases
has either explicitly or implicitly attributed the source of bias to
motivated causes (e.g., Klein, 1996), research on biases in social-
comparative judgments has revealed a role for both motivated and
nonmotivated causes of bias (Alicke, 1985; Chambers & Wind-
schitl, 2004; Weinstein, 1980). Motivated causes for the bias are
implicated when people’s judgments help to address a motivated
concern or goal (e.g., feeling good about oneself, reducing anxiety
about possible negative events; e.g., Alicke, 1985; Klein & Kunda,
1993). The potential relevance of motivated sources of bias on
comparative judgments about eating is easy to imagine. For ex-
ample, people might underestimate their personal consumption of
unhealthy foods compared to others in order to avoid anxiety about
long-term consequences of their unhealthy eating practices (Suls,
Wan, & Sanders, 1988) or to appear healthier than others (Herman,
Fitzgerald, & Polivy, 2003; Vartanian, Herman, & Polivy, 2007;
Vartanian, 2015).
Nonmotivated causes of bias do not serve a motivated goal.
These biases might result from how the specifics of the judgment
task interact with attentional tendencies, knowledge limitations, or
information-processing limitations (Chambers & Windschitl,
2004). The relevance of nonmotivated sources of bias for compar-
ative judgments about eating may be less apparent, but nonetheless
very important. The nonmotivated bias of particular interest in this
paper is egocentrism—the tendency for thoughts about the self to
loom larger than thoughts about others when making judgments
that should involve consideration of both the self and others
(Chambers, Windschitl, & Suls, 2003; Ross & Sicoly, 1979).
When asked for a social-comparative judgment like “How many
donuts do you eat compared to other people?,” people may focus
on how few donuts they eat while failing to fully consider that
other people also eat very few donuts. Because eating donuts is
relatively rare (i.e., consumption tends to be low and relatively
infrequent), an egocentric focus will tend to lead most people (i.e.,
too many people) to estimate they eat less donuts than most other
people like them. As illustrated by this example, a nonmotivated
source of bias might lead to overly positive or flattering judgments
in a given context, but this is by circumstance (e.g., rarity of the
food), not fueled by motivation (e.g., a desire to feel better about
oneself regarding one’s onion ring consumption). While egocen-
trism may systematically decrease social-comparative assessments
of consumption of rare foods, it may systematically increase as-
sessments about common foods. For example, if asked about a
more common food like bread, most respondents may say they eat
more than others do. It is important to note that we are using the
term bias to refer to systematic responses in a particular direction
and not necessarily as a synonym for inaccurate (Jussim, 2005;
West & Kenny, 2011).
Motivated and nonmotivated sources of bias are not mutually
exclusive. They can work together or in opposition within a given
judgment context. Even though they can, at times, work in concert,
they remain conceptually distinct sources of bias that have impor-
tant implications for determining why someone might be resistant
to changing their eating habits. For example, a person who stops
for donuts before work three times a week may be resistant to
reducing their number of donut stops not because they are resistant
to the idea that this is an unhealthy habit, but because they think
they eat a low number of donuts compared to other people—
without realizing that others also eat a low number of donuts. The
present work assessed comparative biases across numerous food
items that varied in healthiness of the food—to introduce a poten-
tial motivated source of bias in consumption estimates—and the
frequency with which the food is generally consumed—to intro-
duce a potential nonmotivated source of bias.
Measurement of Bias
Finally, prior experiments on comparative biases regarding food
have not systematically examined differences between the two
major methods of measuring comparative bias—the direct and
indirect methods (Miles & Scaife, 2003; Scaife et al., 2006). With
the direct method, the respondent is asked to make a comparison
between the self and a referent, such as a generic peer. An example
involving donut consumption would be: “In a typical week, how
many donuts do you eat compared to other people your age and
gender?” With the indirect method, participants make absolute
estimates separately for the self and for a specified referent, such
as a generic peer (e.g., “How many donuts do you eat in a typical
week? How many donuts do other people your age and gender eat
in a typical week?), and a difference or ratio score between the two
answers is calculated by the researcher. Although these two meth-
ods seem to overlap, they are semi-independent and are sometimes
differentially sensitive to motivated and egocentric sources of bias
(Giladi & Klar, 2002; Klar & Ayal, 2004; Otten & Van Der Pligt,
1996; Rose, Suls, & Windschitl, 2011; Weinstein, Lyon, Rothman,
& Cuite, 2000; for a review, see Chambers & Windschitl, 2004).
For example, egocentrism does not apply to the indirect method in
the same way it does to the direct method. In the indirect method,
the peer’s standing cannot easily be neglected by the participant
since the method specifically requires the participant to focus on
the peer in their response (e.g., asking how many donuts the
average person eats).
As mentioned earlier, previous experiments of comparative bias
in the eating domain have used either the direct or indirect method,
with little attention to whether these two methods are sensitive to
the same psychological mechanisms and whether they can be used
interchangeably (Scaife et al., 2006). This has important implica-
tions for the measurement of comparative biases in eating. If a
person exhibits bias in their comparative consumption estimates on
a direct measure, it could be wrong to infer that the source of this
bias is a motivated source of bias, since the direct measure may
actually be picking up on nonmotivated sources of bias, such as
egocentrism. As a result, the present work assessed comparative
biases across numerous food items that allowed the comparison of
direct and indirect measures.
Our Approach and Predictions
We report four experiments with overlapping conceptual aims.
Two of the experiments involved adult residents of Iowa and two
involved college students. In each experiment, we assessed peo-
ple’s beliefs about their consumption of various foods or nutrients
relative to their peers. Depending on the experiment or condition,
we used either a direct or indirect method to solicit comparative
beliefs. We also selected foods that varied along two critical
dimensions—their general healthiness/unhealthiness and the rari-
ty/commonness with which they are consumed. This strategy al-
lowed us to obtain novel information about when and why people
exhibit bias (whether motivated or nonmotivated) in their social
comparative beliefs about food consumption.
We expected to find evidence of both motivated and nonmoti-
vated (specifically egocentric) sources of bias in perceptions of
comparative food consumption, with the role of these biases shift-
ing in magnitude as a function of the measurement method (direct
vs. indirect) being used and the specific foods/nutrients appearing
on the survey. We intentionally selected foods that varied in
healthiness/unhealthiness to allow us to examine the impact of
motivated sources of bias. Since physical health is highly valued
and people are motivated to view themselves as healthy (Dunning,
Heath, & Suls, 2004), we expected people would indicate that they
eat less of a food than their peers when the food is unhealthy
compared to when it is healthy. The fact that we intentionally
selected foods that varied in rarity/commonness allowed us to
examine the impact of egocentrism as a source of nonmotivated
bias on direct measures. Consistent with a role for egocentrism, we
expected people would indicate that they eat less of a food than
their peers when the food is uncommon (such as cauliflower)
compared to when it is common (such as apples) due to partici-
pants’ focus on their own consumption, while neglecting the
consumption of others.
Conceptually consistent with research findings on other forms
of comparative judgment (Chambers et al., 2003; Rose et al.,
2011), we expected that the impact of food commonness would be
modest in biasing responses solicited with the indirect method (i.e.,
soliciting separate judgments for the self and for peers). That is,
egocentrism should not play a significant role for this method,
because participants are required to report on their perceptions of
the eating behaviors of others. However, the impact of food
healthiness (i.e., motivated sources of bias) should show a different
pattern. Namely, we expected that evidence for motivated sources
would be found using both types of measures. The evidence might
be particularly strong on the indirect measures since, as discussed
earlier, egocentrism effects are essentially removed under this
method leaving other biases more room for influence and detection
(for examples from outside of the nutrition domain; see Heine &
Hamamura, 2007; Rose, Endo, Windschitl, & Suls, 2008; Rose et
al., 2011).
To summarize our hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1: Individuals will indicate that they eat less of a
food than their peers when the food is unhealthy compared to
when it is healthy, and indirect measures will be more affected
than direct measures by the healthiness of the food.
Hypothesis 2: Individuals will indicate that they eat less of a
food than their peers when the food is uncommon compared to
when it is common, and direct measures will be more affected
than indirect measures by the commonness of the food.
Experiment 1
Experiment 1 employed direct and indirect methods for assess-
ing community residents’ beliefs about their consumption—rela-
tive to peers’ consumption—of eight foods that varied in com-
monness and healthiness.
Method
Participants. Participants were 102 adult residents of the state
of Iowa. Characteristics of the sample can be found in the online
supplemental material, Table S1, along with population statistics
for Iowa (U.S. Census Bureau, 2010).
Procedure. Participants were recruited via advertisements in
several newspapers published across Iowa and in a daily newsletter
distributed at a large university-affiliated medical center serving
much of the state. The advertisement indicated that the study was
about people’s habits and perceptions about different foods. Those
who wished to participate were instructed to e-mail or call a
member of the research team. Participants were then given a link
to the online survey as well as a code to receive payment. After
consenting online, participants completed the survey, which con-
sisted of several measures of perceptions of food consumption (see
below). Additional items were completed after the measures of
interest, but are not reported because they are irrelevant to the aims
of this paper. At the conclusion, participants submitted their name
and postal address via e-mail to receive a $10 gift card, which was
recorded separately from the survey responses. This procedure
allowed survey responses to remain anonymous. Institutional re-
view board approval was obtained prior to conducting all experi-
ments in this paper.
Design. A 2 (food commonness: uncommon, common)  2
(food healthiness: unhealthy, healthy)  2 (measure: indirect,
direct) within-subject design was used.
Materials. For inclusion in the study, we identified two foods
for each category defined by a common/uncommon  healthy/
unhealthy classification. The foods were selected on the basis of
pilot testing, consultation with nutrition experts, and research team
discussion (see Results for information that validates the selec-
tions). Participants made judgments regarding two healthy-
common foods (apples, yogurt); healthy-uncommon foods (spin-
ach, cauliflower); unhealthy-common foods (cheese, french fries);
and unhealthy-uncommon foods (waffles, onion rings).
Measures. There were three types of consumption measures.
Direct-comparisons questions asked participants “In a typical
week, how does your consumption of each of the foods listed
below compare to others your age and gender?” (2  much less
to  2  much more). Self-estimate questions asked participants
“In a typical week, how many servings of [food] do you con-
sume?,” and the other-estimate question was “In a typical week,
how many servings of [food] does the typical person your age and
gender consume?” An example of a serving was provided (e.g.,
“Think of a serving as one apple”), and responses were open-
ended. Indirect comparisons were calculated by subtracting other-
estimates from self-estimates for each food. Consequently, as with
the direct-comparisons estimates, a positive (negative) score on the
indirect-comparison index indicates greater (lesser) relative con-
sumption.
The questions were organized in blocks by the three judgment
types (i.e., participants answered the same question for the eight
foods before moving on to another type of question). We counter-
balanced whether the direct-comparative block came first or last,
as well as whether the self-estimate block preceded or followed the
other-estimate block. Preliminary analyses indicated no significant
order effects (ps  .31). After the consumption-question blocks,
there was a block of healthiness questions. Participants indicated
the extent to which they thought each food was bad or good for
their health, from very bad (1) to very good (5).
Results and Discussion
Manipulation checks and general trends. Recall that we
preselected foods to fit the common/uncommon  healthy/un-
healthy classification scheme. Preliminary results generally vali-
date these selections. The healthy foods were indeed judged as
more healthy (M  4.66, SD  0.49) than the unhealthy foods
(M  2.08, SD  0.42), t(101)  38.5, p  .001, d  3.81. Table
1 displays the mean healthiness ratings for each individual food.
Also, the common foods were reportedly consumed more by
participants (M  2.47, SD  1.24) than the uncommon foods
(M  0.51, SD  0.57), t(100)  16.8, p  .001, d  1.66.
Consistent with the social norm that “overeating is unhealthy”
(Herman, Roth, & Polivy, 2003), there was an overall tendency
(i.e., across all food types) for people to report consuming less than
peers. This was true for both the direct measure (M  0.80,
SD  0.51), t(101)  15.71, p  .001, d  1.57, and the indirect
measure (M  0.72, SD  0.84), t(101)  8.66, p  .001, d 
0.86. While an interesting finding, we want to stress that this
general tendency for low comparative estimates is orthogonal to
our main predictions and to the key results reported below.
Main analyses. For comparative consumption estimates elic-
ited via the direct method, four aggregate scores were created per
participant (see Table 1)—one each for healthy-common foods
(apples, yogurt), healthy-uncommon foods (spinach, cauliflower),
unhealthy-common foods (cheese, french fries), and unhealthy-
Table 1
Experiment 1 Perceived Healthiness of Foods and Direct and Indirect Estimates of Consumption
Category Food Healthiness (SD) Direct (SD) Indirect (SD)
Healthy, Common Combined 4.59 (.56) .52 (1.09) .35 (2.18)
Apple 4.86 (.51) .58 (1.30) .33 (2.76)
Yogurt 4.31 (.78) .46 (1.40) .42 (2.75)
Healthy, Uncommon Combined 4.74 (.56) .92 (1.02) .36 (1.00)
Spinach 4.81 (.56) .93 (1.22) .30 (1.32)
Cauliflower 4.66 (.65) .91 (1.19) .42 (1.21)
Unhealthy, Common Combined 2.35 (.51) .42 (.81) 1.11 (1.53)
Cheese 3.43 (.92) .14 (1.08) .45 (2.18)
French fries 1.27 (.45) .98 (1.03) 1.75 (1.67)
Unhealthy, Uncommon Combined 1.80 (.56) 1.34 (.72) 1.05 (1.00)
Waffles 2.30 (.77) 1.32 (.82) 1.15 (1.17)
Onion rings 1.29 (.65) 1.36 (.98) .94 (1.24)
Note. Items in bold represent aggregate values across all foods in a given category.
uncommon foods (waffles, onion rings). These aggregates were
submitted to a repeated-measures ANOVA with commonness
(common, uncommon) and healthiness (healthy, unhealthy) as
within-subject factors. The same creation of aggregate scores and
analysis were completed for the indirect measures of consumption.
The aggregates were also submitted to a repeated-measures
ANOVA with measurement method (direct, indirect), common-
ness (common, uncommon), and healthiness (healthy, unhealthy)
as within-subject factors to test for the differential impact of
commonness and healthiness based on measurement method.
Main findings. As expected, the direct comparison estimates
of consumption were strongly influenced by the commonness of
the food, such that participants gave lower direct comparative
estimates for uncommon foods (M  1.14, SD  0.59) than for
common foods (M  0.47, SD  0.66), F(1, 100)  86.9, p 
.001, p2  .47. Once again, while participants indicated that they
thought they ate less food than their peers, this effect was magni-
fied for uncommon foods. This influence of commonness on direct
comparisons is a pattern that is clearly consistent with the hypoth-
esis that egocentrism influenced the magnitude of bias (or is a
source of bias) in these comparison estimates. The effect of
food healthiness on direct estimates was not significant
(Mhealthy  0.73, SD  0.90; Munhealthy  0.88, SD  0.65),
F(1, 100)  1.80, p  .18, p2  .02.
As predicted, the indirect comparison estimates of consumption
were influenced by the healthiness of the food, F(1, 98)  17.57,
p  .001, p2  .15. Specifically, the indirect comparative esti-
mates were lower for unhealthy foods (M  1.08. SD  1.06)
than for healthy foods (M  0.36, SD  1.33), consistent with
an influence of a motivation to view oneself as eating more
healthily than one’s peers. In other words, while participants
thought they ate less food overall than their peers, this effect was
magnified for unhealthy foods. There was no significant effect of
commonness on the indirect estimates (Mcommon  0.74, SD 
1.34; Muncommon  0.71, SD  0.66), F(1, 98)  0.12, p  .73,
p2  .00, and no significant interaction between commonness and
healthiness, F(1, 98)  .06, p  .81, p2  .00.
There was also an unanticipated healthy  commonness inter-
action, such that individuals reported a larger discrepancy in their
comparative estimates between healthy and unhealthy foods for
uncommon foods rather than common foods, F(1, 100)  16.1,
p  .001, p2  .14. The reason for this interaction is not clear and
changes directions in a subsequent experiment (Experiment 3a), so
we will not discuss it further.
Critically, the three-factor repeated-measures ANOVA revealed
an interaction between measurement method and food common-
ness, F(1, 97)  18.12, p  .001, p2  .16, with commonness
influencing direct, but not indirect, estimates, consistent with a
nonmotivated source of bias on direct estimates. Additionally,
there was an interaction between measurement method and food
healthiness, F(1, 97)  36.61, p  .001, p2  .27, with healthiness
influencing indirect, but not direct, estimates, consistent with a
motivated source of bias on indirect estimates. The differential
impact of motivated and nonmotivated sources of bias depending
on measurement method was highlighted by a three-way interac-
tion between measurement method, food commonness, and food
healthiness, F(1, 97)  7.86, p  .006, p2  .08, with the main
effects simply reflecting the results described earlier under the
direct and indirect measure analyses.
In summary, this overall set of results reveals the influence of
both motivated and nonmotivated (egocentric) sources of bias. The
importance of these sources depended on the measurement method
being used. Direct estimates were significantly influenced by food
commonness and the indirect estimates were significantly influ-
enced by food healthiness. This is consistent with the notion that
comparative bias detected with direct measures of comparative
consumption may be substantially shaped by nonmotivated ego-
centrism, whereas bias detected with indirect measures may be
substantially shaped by motivated concerns.
Experiment 2
Experiment 1 demonstrated that people do indeed exhibit com-
parative biases about specific food items (e.g., spinach, fries), but
the reasons and magnitude of the bias depends on how it is
measured. The fact that we surveyed people about specific food
items in Experiment 1, and that we varied them in healthiness
and commonness, was very useful for testing the roles of moti-
vated and nonmotivated sources of bias. However, from an applied
perspective, there might be more interest in how people perceive
their comparative consumption of important and well-known food
categories or elements (e.g., fruits and vegetables, calories, satu-
rated fats). Therefore, in Experiment 2 we surveyed people’s
beliefs about eight of these food categories or elements, which are
of clear importance to issues of public health. Given that our
selection of these was guided by their importance for health, we
did not systematically vary commonness. Of the eight items being
surveyed, two were healthy and six were unhealthy.
Method
Participants and procedure. The same recruitment methods
used in Experiment 1 obtained a sample of 91 Iowa residents (see
characteristics in the online supplemental material, Table S1).
Survey administration and participant payment procedures were
also the same as in Experiment 1.
Design. A 2 (food category/element healthiness: unhealthy,
healthy)  2 (measure: indirect, direct) within-subject design was
used.
Materials. Eight well-known food categories and elements
were included in the survey. Two are generally considered healthy
(fruits and vegetables, fiber), whereas the remaining six (red meat,
saturated fat, total fat, calories, salt, and sugar) are not (confirmed
in results described below). A greater proportion of less healthy
food categories and elements were chosen due to the emphasis on
unhealthy foods, food categories, and food elements in previous
research on food comparative estimates (Miles & Scaife, 2003;
Scaife et al., 2006).
Measures. The perceived healthiness and direct comparisons
of each category/element were measured in the same way as
Experiment 1. Because it is unlikely that individuals track the
quantities of nutrients in terms of servings, changes were made to
the wording of the self- and other-estimate questions (i.e., the
items used to calculate the indirect estimates). Participants were
asked: “In a typical week, how much of the following do you eat?”
and “In a typical week, how much of the following do other people
your age and gender eat?” (1  none or very little; 5  a lot). The
order of the question blocks (direct, self, and other) were again
counterbalanced across participants. Preliminary analyses indi-
cated no significant order effects (ps  .24).
Results and Discussion
Manipulation checks and general trends. Consistent with
our assumptions about perceived healthiness, participants rated
fruits and vegetables and fiber as being healthier (M  4.81, SD 
0.49) than red meat, saturated fat, total fat, calories, sodium, and
sugar (M  2.19, SD  0.53), t(90)  30.11, p  .001, d  3.16
(see Table 2). As in Experiment 1, both the direct and indirect
methods revealed that, overall, participants believed that they
consumed less foods/elements than their peers (see Table 2 for
each food/element). The average direct estimate was 0.13 (SD 
0.53), t(91)  2.34, p  .02, d  0.25 and the average indirect
estimate was 0.22 (SD  0.66), t(87)  3.15, p  .002, d 
0.33.
Main analyses. Separate aggregates for the direct and indirect
comparative indices were created for healthy foods/elements
(fruits and vegetables, fiber) and for unhealthy foods/elements (red
meat, saturated fat, total fat, calories, salt, sugar). These healthy
and unhealthy aggregates were compared using a paired t test for
both the direct and indirect measures. These aggregates were also
submitted to a repeated-measures ANOVA with measurement
method (direct, indirect) and healthiness (healthy, unhealthy) as
within-subject factors.
Main findings. Unlike Experiment 1, direct estimates showed
evidence of the impact of healthiness on perceptions of compara-
tive consumption. Participants gave significantly lower direct com-
parative estimates for unhealthy foods/elements (M  0.26,
SD  0.77) than for the healthy foods/elements (M  0.26, SD 
1.04), t(90)  3.31, p  .001, d  0.35. The indirect measures
also provided evidence for the impact of the healthiness of the
food/element. Participants gave significant lower indirect compar-
ative estimates for unhealthy foods/elements (M  0.51, SD 
1.06) than for the healthy foods/elements (M  0.63, SD  1.39),
t(86)  4.83, p  .001, d  0.52. While the healthiness of the
food impacted both direct and indirect measures, there was a
significant interaction between measurement method and healthi-
ness, F(1, 86)  20.21, p  .001, p2  .19, with the healthiness
of the food having a larger influence on indirect estimates relative
to direct estimates. This interaction is theoretically consistent with
the results of Experiment 1 demonstrating that indirect measures
are more sensitive to motivational sources of bias compared to
direct measures.
In short, when people are surveyed about food categories and
elements that are widely perceived as important for human health-
iness or unhealthiness, their pattern of responses reveal clear
biases. Specifically, the pattern of biases is consistent with the
notion that motivated factors are important. This is true whether a
direct or indirect method of measurement is used.
Experiments 3a and 3b
Experiments 1 and 2 produced a number of empirical results
at the sample level that reveal systematic biases in social
comparative beliefs about food consumption. If entirely unbi-
ased, we would have expected that for every food item, the
sample mean for estimates would be roughly at 0 (meaning
same as other people). This would be true regardless of method
used or the level of healthiness and commonness of a given
food. However, in both experiments, grand means from the
sample tended to fall below 0, suggesting general underestima-
tion of comparative food consumption. In Experiment 1, the
means from direct measures shifted as a function of food
commonness, suggesting a role for egocentrism. Finally, in both
experiments, food healthiness produced a main effect on indi-
rect measures (and direct measures in Experiment 2), suggest-
ing a significant role for a motivated source of bias.
These findings are very important for understanding sources of
bias in comparative judgments of food consumption and worth
replicating with new samples. Also, a key limitation from Exper-
iment 1 was that we utilized only a small number (two) of foods
per group. Therefore, we conducted two additional experiments
(3a and 3b), this time with college student samples. These exper-
iments provided an opportunity to replicate the key findings from
Experiment 1, but with a much larger set of foods. They also
provided an opportunity to replicate the key findings from Exper-
iment 2 (with no changes to the list of 8 important food categories
or elements).
As a pair, Experiments 3a and 3b covered the same conceptual
territory as Experiments 1 and 2, but they were organized differ-
ently. Recall that Experiments 1 and 2 differed from each other in
their food lists, but they shared the fact that all participants were
Table 2
Experiment 2 Perceived Healthiness of Food Categories/Elements and Direct and Indirect
Estimates of Consumption
Category Food Category/Element Healthiness (SD) Direct (SD) Indirect (SD)
Healthy Combined 4.81 (.49) .26 (1.04) .63 (1.39)
Fruits and vegetables 4.89 (.48) .24 (1.25) .67 (1.63)
Fiber 4.74 (.61) .30 (1.08) .59 (1.42)
Unhealthy Combined 2.19 (.53) .26 (.77) .51 (1.06)
Calories 2.77 (.85) .12 (.87) .15 (1.19)
Red meat 2.57 (.93) .44 (1.14) .66 (1.52)
Total fat 2.22 (.84) .28 (1.05) .23 (1.24)
Sodium/Salt 2.04 (.82) .51 (.89) .83 (1.35)
Sugar 1.96 (.77) .10 (1.08) .60 (1.43)
Saturated fat 1.57 (.83) .38 (1.02) .57 (1.29)
Note. Items in bold represent aggregate values across all food categories/elements in a given category.
tested with direct and indirect methods. Experiments 3a and 3b
shared the same food lists, which included 32 specific foods as
well the same eight important food categories as used in Experi-
ment 2. To avoid participant fatigue in answering direct and
indirect measures for all 32 foods, Experiment 3a used the direct
method whereas 3b used the indirect method.
Method
Participants, procedures, and measures. The participants
for our experiments (Experiment 3a n  20; Experiment 3b n 
35) were University of Iowa students from an introductory psy-
chology course. In Experiment 3a, participants provided estimates
of how their consumption of different food items (see Foods
below) compared to their peers (i.e., direct estimates). In Experi-
ment 3b, participants provided separate, open-ended estimates of
how much they consume of the items and estimates of how much
their peers consume, in a counterbalanced order. We used these
responses to compute the indirect estimates. After responding to a
set of additional items, all participants provided responses to
demographics questions and were debriefed.
Design. A 2 (food healthiness: unhealthy, healthy)  2 (food
healthiness: unhealthy, healthy) within-subject design was used.
Materials. Both experiments used the same list of food items.
This included 32 specific foods, selected on the basis of the same
common/uncommon  healthy/unhealthy classifications from Ex-
periment 1. The list also included the same eight food categories
and elements used in Experiment 2 (e.g., fiber, red meat, salt). We
counterbalanced whether people first responded to a random order
of 32 foods or to a random ordering of the eight food categories/
elements.
Among the 32 specific foods, there were eight healthy-common
foods (apples, yogurt, chicken, bananas, milk, oranges, salad,
100% fruit juice), eight healthy-uncommon foods (spinach, cauli-
flower, tofu, kiwi, salmon, black beans, pinto beans, asparagus),
eight unhealthy-common foods (cheese, fries, burgers, chips, ta-
cos, mayo, pizza, ice cream), and eight unhealthy-uncommon
foods (waffles, onion rings, corn dogs, pudding, breadsticks,
cheesecake, pie, and sausage). Note that the food items used in
Experiment 1 are included within the larger set of 32 foods.
Results and Discussion
General trends. Once again, there was an overall tendency to
report consuming less of the specific foods than peers, for the
direct measures in Experiment 3a (M  0.48, SD  0.43),
t(19)  4.99, p  .001, d  1.11, and the indirect measures in
Experiment 3b (M  1.12, SD  1.08), t(34)  6.13, p 
.001, d  1.04. A similar pattern was found for the indirect
measures of food categories/elements (M  0.40, SD  0.46),
t(19)  5.17, p  .001, d  0.87, and directionally, but not
significantly, for the direct measures (M  0.16, SD  0.53),
t(19)  1.31, p  .21, d  0.30.
Main analyses. Direct and indirect measures were calculated
and aggregated in the same way as Experiments 1 and 2. Similar
to Experiment 1, the four aggregates from the 32 specific foods
were submitted to a 2 (healthiness)  2 (commonness) repeated-
measures ANOVA. As in Experiment 2, the two aggregates from
the food categories/elements were analyzed using paired-samples t
tests.
Main findings.
Direct estimates for the 32 specific foods (Experiment 3a).
Replicating Experiment 1—and consistent with an effect of a
nonmotivated source of bias (re: egocentrism)—direct comparison
estimates were strongly influenced by the commonness of the
food, such that participants gave significantly lower estimates for
uncommon foods (M  0.73, SD  0.40) than for common
foods (M  0.23, SD  0. 52), F(1, 19)  39.33, p  .001, p2 
.67. The main effect of food healthiness was marginally signifi-
cant, with participants’ comparative estimates being lower for
unhealthy foods (M  0.68, SD  0.54) than healthy foods
(M  0.28, SD  0.68), F(1, 19)  4.21, p  .054, p2  .18.
This trend suggests a role for a motivated source of bias. Power
analysis using GPower 3.1 conducted after we ran Experiments 3a
indicated finding a within-subject difference in means with a
moderate effect size (p2  .06) with 80% power and two-tailed 	
probability of .05, requires a sample size of n  32, suggesting that
this marginal effect may be the results of Study 3a being under-
powered to detect moderate effects. Finally, there was also an
unanticipated healthiness  commonness interaction, such that
individuals reported a larger discrepancy in their comparative
estimates between healthy and unhealthy foods for common foods
rather than uncommon foods, F(1, 19)  8.74, p  .008, p2  .32
(see Table 3). This interaction pattern was the reverse of the
pattern observed in Experiment 1. It is unclear why the interaction
pattern reversed, but it may have shifted due to the inclusion of the
24 new foods. When only looking at the foods from Experiment 1,
the interaction was not significant, F(1, 19)  1.31, p  .27, p2 
.06, but the trend is in the same direction as the results with all 32
food items.
Indirect estimates for the specific foods (Experiment 3b).
Consistent with the results of Experiment 1, and in contrast with
the direct comparison results, the commonness effect was not
significant, (Mcommon  1.18, SD  1.31; Muncommon  1.05,
SD  1.05), F(1, 34)  0.76, p  .39, p2  .02, but the healthiness
effect was significant, F(1, 34)  28.73, p  .001, p2  .46. More
specifically, the indirect estimates were lower for unhealthy foods
(M  1.73. SD  1.22) than for healthy foods (M  0.52,
SD  1.32), consistent with an effect of motivated concerns (see
Table 3). The factors of commonness and healthiness did not
interact, F(1, 34)  0.12, p  .73, p2  .00.
Direct and indirect estimates for the eight food categories/
elements (Experiments 3a and 3b). The pattern of results is
essentially identical to that found in Experiment 2. The direct
comparative estimates (Experiment 3a) were higher for healthy
food categories/elements (M  0.23, SD  0.95) than the un-
healthy food categories/elements (M  0.28, SD  0.68),
t(19)  1.83, p  .08, d  0.41. While the p value for this effect
was marginally significant (two-tailed), the effect size is of the
same general magnitude as detected in Experiment 2. Also, the
indirect comparative estimates (Experiment 3b) were again signif-
icantly higher for healthy food categories/elements (M  0.56,
SD  1.01) than the unhealthy food categories/elements
(M  0.72, SD  0.66), t(34)  5.37, p  .001, d  0.91 (see
Table 4). As in Experiment 2, these differential patterns suggest
again that, for these important food categories/elements, motiva-
tion is a key source of bias with either method, and but it is
especially strong with the indirect measures.
Summary. Overall, the results from Experiments 3a and 3b
replicate those from Experiments 1 and 2 with a different sample
and an expanded number of specific foods, providing confidence
about the generalizability of the findings.
General Discussion
Our goal was to investigate the scope, sources, and measure-
ments of bias in comparative food consumption beliefs. Regarding
the scope of bias, our experiments revealed that there is a general
trend for people to believe they eat less than their peers, regardless
of whether the foods are healthy or unhealthy. This finding is not
surprising, given the existence of the social norm that “overeating
is unhealthy” (Herman, Fitzgerald et al., 2003; Higgs, 2015).
However, it is worth noting the pervasiveness of this result across
foods, given that the previous literature has tended to focus on the
consumption of specific foods (Higgs, 2015). Given that this social
norm also affects the consumption of healthy foods, future inter-
ventions should focus on disentangling healthy foods from the
“overeating is unhealthy” social norm. While there are obviously
other barriers to promoting healthy eating, giving people license to
“overindulge” on healthy foods may be an effective way of im-
proving the eating habits of individuals who have difficulty con-
trolling their food consumption.
Both the healthiness and commonness of the food moderated the
tendency to report consuming less than their peers, implicating the
influence of both motivated and nonmotivated sources of bias.
This effect was exaggerated for unhealthy foods compared to
healthier foods, supporting the common narrative that biases in
comparative beliefs about food consumption are the result of
self-enhancement (e.g., Klein, 1996). However, this effect was
exaggerated for rare foods compared to more common foods,
suggesting that comparative beliefs about food consumption are
also susceptible to a nonmotivated source of bias, such as egocen-
trism. Furthermore, the method used to assess comparative beliefs
about food consumption also mattered. Responses on the indirect
measures were particularly sensitive to the healthiness of food
items, indicating a greater sensitivity to motivated sources of bias.
Alternatively, responses on the direct measures were particularly
sensitive to the commonness of food items, indicating a greater
sensitivity to nonmotivated sources of bias such as egocentrism.
Overall, these results reveal that whether people will exhibit a bias
in perceptions of comparative food consumption will depend on
the type of items being surveyed, the solicitation method used, and
both the commonness and healthiness of the individual food items.
Applications
These results reveal a critical need for researchers to be mindful
of the design and interpretation of studies involving comparative
estimates of relative food consumption. Here we mention three
examples relevant to this point. First, a wealth of research in
psychology reveals that social comparisons and perceived social
comparative standing have influences on behavior (Blalock et al.,
1990; Goffin & Olson, 2011; Klein, 2002, 2003; Lipkus & Klein,
2006; Mahler et al., 2010). Also, soliciting perceived social com-
Table 3
Experiments 3a and 3b Direct and Indirect Estimates of






Healthy, Common Combined .12 (.71) .57 (1.72)
Apple .15 (1.23) .20 (1.89)
Yogurt .35 (1.46) .87 (1.66)
Chicken .35 (1.39) .16 (4.20)
Bananas .05 (1.36) .63 (2.62)
Milk .35 (1.27) 1.07 (4.90)
Oranges .30 (1.13) .27 (2.28)
Salad .20 (1.54) .94 (3.60)
Fruit juice .20 (1.32) 1.10 (2.63)
Healthy, Uncommon Combined .68 (.77) .47 (1.27)
Spinach .30 (1.56) .19 (1.80)
Cauliflower .85 (1.31) .29 (1.31)
Tofu 1.05 (1.47) .37 (1.56)
Kiwi .90 (1.07) .60 (1.19)
Salmon .10 (1.65) .67 (2.13)
Black beans .45 (1.32) .69 (1.98)
Pinto beans 1.15 (1.09) .81 (2.10)
Asparagus .65 (1.46) .14 (1.81)
Unhealthy, Common Combined .58 (.59) 1.82 (1.47)
Cheese .20 (1.36) 1.71 (2.92
French fries .75 (1.12) 1.70 (2.17)
Burgers .85 (1.04) 1.74 (2.60)
Chips .95 (1.00) 2.69 (2.91)
Tacos .60 (1.19) 1.49 (2.33)
Mayo 1.05 (1.19) 1.34 (1.35)
Pizza .05 (1.00) 1.76 (2.70)
Ice cream .15 (1.09) 2.11 (2.61)
Unhealthy, Uncommon Combined .79 (.62) 1.63 (1.15)
Waffles .25 (1.25) 2.13 (1.17)
Onion rings 1.30 (1.03) 1.59 (1.31)
Corn dogs 1.40 (.82) 1.60 (1.63)
Pudding .50 (1.05) 1.66 (1.57)
Breadsticks .35 (1.18) 1.86 (1.83)
Cheesecake .85 (1.27) 1.00 (1.18)
Pie .90 (1.21) 1.23 (1.92)
Sausage .75 (1.07) 2.00 (2.27)
Note. Items in bold represent aggregate values across all foods in a given
category.
Table 4
Experiments 3a and 3b Direct and Indirect Estimates of








Healthy Combined .23 (.95) .56 (1.01)
Fruits and vegetables .60 (1.27) .71 (1.31)
Fiber .15 (.88) .40 (1.24)
Unhealthy Combined .28 (.68) .72 (.66)
Saturated fat .45 (.89) .89 (.93)
Total fat .75 (.91) .86 (.94)
Calories .05 (.99) .43 (.82)
Salt .20 (1.05) .89 (1.02)
Sugar .35 (.81) .89 (1.13)
Red meat .70 (1.34) .37 (1.40)
Note. Items in bold represent aggregate values across all food categories/
elements in a given category.
parative standing on food/nutrient consumption is a relatively easy
and efficient way to survey people about their food behavior.
Consequently, we would not be surprised to see an increase in
surveys aimed at measuring such beliefs. However, without ap-
preciating the lessons offered in the present work, a researcher
might select an overly narrow set of food items (e.g., all uncom-
mon foods), that would leave systematic patterns of bias (e.g.,
systematic below-average estimates) open to dueling interpreta-
tions. Even researchers who survey people about the social com-
parative beliefs about just one particular item (e.g., fiber, coffee)
should still find our main point to be important for interpreting any
bias (or the absence of overall bias) they observe. The importance
of these lessons extend beyond surveys about the sort of specific
foods or nutrients we examined—into other categories of interest
(e.g., “How much organic food do you purchase relative to other
shoppers? How many home cooked meals do you prepare relative
to other parents?”).
Second, a researcher who is specifically interested in ego-
protective biases and/or other motivations as a source of bias in
comparative beliefs about food consumption should be deliberate
in choice of methodology. An indirect measure of comparative
beliefs about food consumption can be used to reduce the effect of
nonmotivated sources of bias and better isolate the role of moti-
vated effects. Better isolating motivated effects might improve a
researcher’s ability to detect not only how motivation impacts bias,
but how it might operate as a mediator driven by other respondent
characteristics (e.g., being currently overweight vs. not, being a
teenage vs. older adult). Indirect measures may also be a better
choice for assessing the impact of interventions that strive to
reduce motivations people might have to perceive their eating
behavior as more healthy than their peers.
Third, the current research also suggests that nonmotivated
sources of bias could be considered or even harnessed when
crafting interventions to promote healthy eating. For example, a
person might be much more open to changing their eating habits or
receiving information about ways to change their eating habits if
they are first asked to focus on their consumption of common,
unhealthy foods (e.g., pizza) compared to if they are asked to focus
on their consumption of uncommon, unhealthy foods (e.g., onion
rings). Regarding healthy foods, focusing people on whether they
eat as many apples (a common food) as their peers might be less
productive than focusing them on whether they eat as much
spinach as others (a less common food).
Limitations
It is worth noting that the current experiments relied upon small
samples of community residents and university undergraduates
from Iowa. Although these limitations constrain the assumed gen-
eralizability of the results, the role of food commonness and
healthiness were consistent with predictions from basic research
about motivated and cognitive factors affecting the perception of
social norms (e.g., Rose et al., 2008) and the results and effects
sizes were consistent across our two rather different samples.
Consequently, we suggest that these motivated and cognitive fac-
tors should play similar roles across regions and populations, albeit
perhaps shifting in relative influence. Of course, the interpretations
of what foods are deemed healthy and common would be subject
to cultural variation. An additional limitation of the experiments is
that we asked participant to respond about others their age and
gender. By not focusing participants on a particular part of the
distribution of their peers, such as their “average” peer, it is
possible that participants used different referents for different
types of foods. For example, they may have focused on unhealthy
peers when providing judgments about unhealthy foods and fo-
cused on healthy peers when providing judgments about healthy
foods. While this could be a topic for follow-up research (e.g.,
comparing “peer” judgments to “average peer” judgments), it is
unclear how shifting referents within a group would account for
the impact of food commonness on comparative judgments or the
differential sensitivity of the direct measures to the commonness of
the foods and the indirect measures to the healthiness of the foods.
Remaining Questions
While we have highlighted how the results of the current ex-
periments have implications for the interventions aimed at increas-
ing healthy eating and the measurement of comparative biases in
food consumption, there are additional research questions. One
important future direction will be the examination of the conse-
quences of comparative biases on behavioral intentions to change
eating habits. Relatedly, more research is needed to determine how
traditional moderators of social comparison effects influence eat-
ing behavior (Polivy & Pliner, 2015). As an example, a potentially
important consideration for future research is the comparison tar-
get. The current experiments focused on comparisons to same-age,
same-gender peers. However, individuals might actually be more
sensitive to local comparisons, such as family, friends, or cowork-
ers, which might attenuate or exaggerate the findings of the current
experiments (Bruchmann & Evans, 2013; Miller, Turnbull, &
McFarland, 1988; Zell & Alicke, 2010). Additional avenues of
research include manipulating the perceived healthiness of an
ambiguously healthy food and assessing the impact on both direct
and indirect measures of comparative beliefs about food consump-
tion; assessing the implications of the detected biases for various
forms of accuracy (such as deviations of subjective assessments
from objective comparative standing); and examining whether
individual differences, such as whether the person is on a diet or
not, moderate any of the effects observed in the current experi-
ments.
Conclusion
Practitioners and public health campaigns often draw attention
to individuals’ levels of food consumption to promote increased
healthy eating. Ironically, the results of the current experiments
suggest that a majority of the individuals believe that they already
eat more healthily than their peers, which may cause these mes-
sages to be disregarded by some of the individuals for which the
appeals are targeted. However, the reason why, and extent to
which individuals report that they eat more healthily than their
peers may be dependent on how they are asked about their per-
ceptions of comparative consumption. The nonequivalence of
measurement methods highlights the need for researchers to be
sensitive to how they measure perceptions of comparative eating
habits in future research.
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